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Comment, Defining and Upholding State Rights To
Regulate Tender Offers after MITE and CTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has decided two cases over the
past seven years dealing with state regulation of tender offers. 1 In the
first case, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 2 the Court invalidated the Illinois
Business Takeover Act, 3 concluding that its provisions were preempted
under the supremacy clause and violated the commerce clause of the
U.S. Constitution. During the five years after MITE, other courts followed the analysis of the United States Supreme Court in finding various state anti-takeover• statutes unconstitutional. In each case the statutes were found violative of the commerce clause, 11 the supremacy
clause, 6 or both. 7 In light of the numerous decisions striking down such
1. The term "tender offer" is generally regarded as an invitation, publicly made to all shareholders of a corporation, to sell their shares at a specified price. However, the Williams Act, infra
sections II, III, and IV, does not define tender offer and its exact meaning is unsettled. See Note,
"The Tender Balance": Dynamics Corporation of America v. CTS Corporation, 63 CHI.[ -]KENT
L. REV. 345 (1987), which provides a historical summary of tender offers and state tender offer
statutes.

2. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
3. lt.L REV. STAT., ch. 121 1/z, para. 137.51-137.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)(repealed
1983) These provisions were repealed after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in MITE.
4. As noted in footnote 1 of the Court's MITE decision, the terms "tender offer" and "takeover offer" are often used interchangeably. Therefore, it is assumed that the term "anti-takeover"
may be used to delineate those statutes which regulate takeovers, and therefore regulate tender
offers. The term "anti-takeover" is used without the assumption that its purpose is to prevent
takeovers and tender offers, but represents the substantive and procedural regulation of such transactions. This will be true throughout the text of this comment.
5. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes .
6. U.S. CaNST. art. VI, cl. 2. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States .
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
In each case discussed and cited in this comment the supremacy clause and preemption issue
arose under the provisions of the Williams Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f)(1982 and
Supp. Ill 1985).
7. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (lOth Cir.
1983 )(Oklahoma Take-Over Bid Act violative of the commerce clause); Tel vest Inc. v. Bradshaw,
697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983)(Virginia Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act violative of the commerce
clause); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982)(Michigan TakeOver Offers Act violative of the commerce clause); National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d
1122 (8th Cir. 1982)(Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act violative of both the commerce clause
and the supremacy clause); Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md.
1982)(Maryland Corporate Take-Over Laws violative of the commerce clause and the supremacy
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state statutes it was questioned whether the states could validly regulate
tender offers. 8
On April 21, 1987, the United States Supreme Court decided the
second case in this area, CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of
America. 9 In this case, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Indiana Control Shares Acquisition Chapter of the Indiana Business
Corporations Law, 10 under both the commerce clause and the
supremacy clause. This decision appears to have revived and clarified
the rights of the states to regulate in this area. 11

clause); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 466 A.2d 919 (N.H. 1983)(New Hampshire Security
Takeover Disclosure Act violative of the commerce clause); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S. W.2d
768 (Ky. 1982)(Kentucky Take-Over Bids Disclosure Act violative of commerce clause).
8. Prior to i'vflTr.· the states had apparently assumed the power to regulate tender offers as
part of their power to regulate and govern corporate law. The extent of this assumption is demonstrated by the numerous provisions which existed before MITE. See Warren, Developments in
State Takeover Regulation: MITE and Its Aftermath, 40 Bus. LAw 671 nn.2-3 (1984), which
lists thirty-seven separate state anti-takeover statutes enacted before the MITE decision.
However, the Court's MITE decision was preceded by several cases in which lower courts
invalidated state takeover statutes. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1980)(New Jersey Corporation Takeover Bid Disclosure Law violative of the supremacy clause);
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. LeRoy v.
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)(1daho Take-Over Act violative of both the commerce clause and the supremacy clause); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa.
1981 )(Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law violative of both the commerce clause and the
supremacy clause); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I (S.D. Ind. 1978)(Delaware
Tender Offers Art violative of both the commerce clause and the supremacy clause).
9. 481 U.S. 69 ( 1987)
10. INn. Com ANN.§§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (Burns Supp. 1987).
11. Comment, Beyond CTS: A Limited Defense of State Tender Offer Disclosure Requirements, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 657 n.39 (1987), lists the following twenty-eight state statutes which
are presently in existence and which are similar in content to the Indiana statute upheld in CTS:
ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010-45.57.120 (1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to 671264.14 (1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 36-456 to 36-469 (1981 and Supp. 1986);
DEI.. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1981 and Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 417E-1 to
417E-11 (1985); IDAHO CoDE§§ 30-1501 to 30-1513 (Supp. 1986); IowA Cont: ANN.
§§ 502.102, 502.211-502.2156 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to
17-1285 (1981 and Supp. 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-51:1512 (Supp.
1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110c, §§ 1-13 (Law. Co-op. 1985); MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 451.901-451.917 (WestSupp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-80B.13
(1986); Mtss. C:om. ANN.§§ 75-72-101 to 75-72-121 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT
§§ 409.500-409.'131 (Vernon Supp. 1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2418 to 21-2430
(1983); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 78-376 to 78-3778 (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
421-AI to 421-A16 (1983 and Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to 49:5-19
(West Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. §§ 1600-1613 (McKinney 1986); N.C. Gt:N.
STAT.§§ 78B-1 to 788-11 (1985); OHIO REv. Com: ANN.§ 1707.041 (Anderson
1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 431-450 (West Supp. 1987); 70 PA. CoNs. STAT.
ANN. §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.C. ConE ANN.§§ 35-2-10 to 35-2-130 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1985); S.D. CoDIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-32-1 to 47-32-48 (1983);
TENN. ConE ANN.§§ 48-5-102 to 48-5-112 (1984); VA. Com: ANN.§§ 13.1-528 to
13.1-541 (1985); Wts. STAT. ANN.§§ 552.01-552.25 (West Supp. 1986).
/d.
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This comment explains and analyzes the United States Supreme
Court's reasoning in both MITE and CTS. It demonstrates the extent
to which CTS is an extension of MITE while also detailing the important differences between the two cases and the respective state statutes
on which these cases are based. Finally, the probable effects of the CTS
decision are presented and recommendations are made regarding the
future application of this revolutionary case. 12

II.

SuMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF

Edgar v. MITE

The MITE Corporation is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut. 13 James Edgar, the defendant,
was the Secretary of State for the State of Illinois, charged with the
administration and enforcement of the Illinois Business Takeover Act. 14
On January 19, 1979, MITE initiated a cash tender offer for the outstanding shares of an Illinois corporation, Chicago Rivet and Machine
Co. On this same date, MITE filed the schedule required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, in compliance with the provisions of
the Williams Act. 111 MITE made a tender offer of $28 for each share of
Chicago Rivet and Machine stock, but failed to comply with the provisions of the Illinois Business Takeover Act. 16 MITE immediately commenced this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, asking for a declaratory judgment that the Illinois
Act was preempted by the Williams Act and that it violated the commerce clause. 17 MITE also sought a temporary restraining order and
permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Act by the Illinois
Secretary of State. 18
On February 2, 1979, the district court granted a preliminary injunction from enforcement of the Illinois Act and entered final judg12. The scope of this comment is primarily limited to analysis of these two cases, their interplay, differentiation and effects. Extensive inquiry into economic issues resulting from state tender
offer statutes is beyond that scope. However, detailed analysis of economic issues has been addressed in a number of articles. See Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA.
L. REv. 1257 (1985); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 371 (1980); Fischel, f.jficient Capital Market Theory,
the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV.
1 ( 1978); Note, Antitakeover Legislation: Not Necessary, Not Wise, 35 Cu:v. ST. L. REv. 303
(1987).
13. MITt;, 457 U.S. at 626.
14. ILL Rt:v. STAT., ch. 121 Yz, para. 137.51 to 137.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)(repealed
1983).
15. M/Tf.', 457 U.S at 627.
16. /d. at 628.
17. /d.
18. /d.
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ment on February 9, 1979, stating that the Illinois Act was preempted
by the Williams Act and that it violated the commerce clause. 19 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision on both preemption and commerce clause grounds. 20
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction 21
and affirmed the decisions of the two lower courts. 22 In determining
that the Illinois Act was unconstitutional, the Court first considered the
purpose of the Williams Act and the preemptive power of that federal
statute under the supremacy clause. Second, the Court analyzed the Illinois Act's impact on interstate commerce, in light of the commerce
clause.

A. The Supremacy Clause and the Preemptive Effect of the Williams
Act23
Three Justices, White, Burger and Blackmun, believed that the
Illinois Act violated the supremacy clause because it conflicted with the
purposes of the Williams Act. 24 These Justices stated that "Congress
19. /d. at 629. It is interesting to note that after the district court's decision, MITE and
Chicago Rivet entered into an agreement whereby all prior tender offers were extinguished and
MITE was allowed to inspect Chicago Rivet's books for thirty days, after which it could make a
tender offer of $31 per share~-which tender offer Chicago Rivet agreed not to contest-or MITE
could decide not to proceed with a tender offer. On March 2, MITE announced that it had
decided not to make a tender offer.
20. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 1980).
21. 451 U.S. 968 (1981).
22. Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Before beginning analysis of the Supreme Court's
decision, it should be noted that the Court's opinion in MITE is fragmented, to say the least, with
six separate opinions being filed.
On the issue of the commerce clause, Justice White's opinion was joined by Chief Justice
Burger. /d. at 640. Justices Powell, Stevens and O'Connor filed separate opinions concurring with
the portion of Justice White's commerce clause analysis which stated that the burdens placed on
interstate commerce outweighed any local interest served by the Illinois Act. Justices Burger, Stevens and O'Connor also agreed with Justice White's opinion that the Act was unconstitutional as
a direct regulation of interstate commerce.
Furthermore, on the supremacy clause issue, Justice White was joined by Justices Burger
and Blackmun. They reasoned that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act since it
violated the neutrality and investor autonomy purposes of the federal Act. /d. at 630.
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Brennan. /d. at 655. Finally,
Justice Rehnquist filed a separate dissenting opinion. /d. at 664.
23. This portion of Justice White's opinion did not constitute a majority opinion as it was
joined only by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun. The overall fragmentation of the
opinion led the CTS majority to state, "As the plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the
views of a majority of the Court, we are not bound by its reasoning." CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987). However, the CTS Court also stated that it thought the
Indiana Act passed the Williams Act purposes articulated by Justice White. /d. at 82.
24. MITE, 457 U.S. at 631.
[A] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility . . . ,' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
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[in passing the Williams Act] sought to protect the investor not only by
furnishing him with the necessary information but also by withholding
from management or the bidder any undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an informed choice." 211 The Williams Act was
therefore seen as an information-requiring mechanism under which the
offeror must disclose information regarding its background and identity,
the source of its purchasing funds, the purpose of its purchase, and its
previous holdings in the target company. 26 In addition, the Williams
Act is seen as a shareholder protecting statute since it 1) allows stockholders to withdraw their tendered shares during the first seven days of
the tender offer or at any time after the first 60 days if the offeror has
not yet purchased their shares, 27 and 2) requires that all shares be purchased at the same price. 28
These three Justices concluded that the Illinois Act had three provisions which "upset the careful balance struck by Congress" between
offerors and target management. 29 First, the Illinois Act contained a
pre-commencement requirement under which an offeror had to make
known its intent to purchase, to the Illinois Secretary of State, 20 days
before its offer became effective. 30 Second, the Illinois Act created potential for unreasonable delay since the Secretary of State could call a
hearing during the 20 day pre-commencement period to determine the
fairness of the offer. The Secretary's decision could be delayed indefinitely under the Act. 31 Third, the Illinois Act gave the Secretary of
State power to deny registration of the tender offer if he determined the
tender offer to be inequitable or the disclosure to be less than full and
fair. 32

B.

The Commerce Clause

A majority of the Court agreed that the Illinois Act violated the
commerce clause, 33 stating, "A state statute must be upheld if it 'regu132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state 'law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)

I d.
25. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634.
26. Id. at 632 (citing IS U.S.C. § 78n (d)(1)(1982 and Supp. III 1985); 17 C.F.R. §
240.24d-3 (1981))
27. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(5)(1982 and Supp. III 1985).
28. IS U.S.C. § 78n (d)(7)(1982 and Supp. III 1985).
29. MITE, 457 U.S. at 634.
30. ILL. Rt:v. STAT. ch. 121 Yz, para. 137.54.A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)(repealed 1983).
31. ILL. Rt:v. STAT. ch. 121 Yz, para. 137.57.A (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)(repealed 1983).
32. ILL. Rt:v. STAT. ch. 121 1/z, para. 137.57.E (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)(repealed 1983).
33. See supra note 22.
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lates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and
its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental . . . unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.' " 34 First, the Court found that the Illinois Act
placed excessive burdens on interstate commerce by giving the Secretary
of State power to deny nationwide tender offers. 311 The Court reasoned
that hindering tender offers not only interfered with shareholder opportunity to profit by tendering shares, but also obstructed the improved
efficiency and reallocation of economic resources accomplished by
tender offers. 36
Second, the Court rejected arguments that the burdens of the Illinois Act are justified since the Act protects resident shareholders and
regulates the internal affairs of Illinois corporations. "While protecting
local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the State has no
legitimate interest in protecting non-resident shareholders. Insofar as
the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be
weighed in the balance to sustain the law." 37 In addition, "[t]ender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and
do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target company."
Finally, the Act "applies to corporations that are not incorporated in
Illinois and have their principal place of business in other states. " 38
Four members of the Court felt that the Illinois Act also violated
the commerce clause by directly regulating interstate commerce. 39 "Because the Illinois Act purports to regulate directly and to interdict interstate commerce, including commerce wholly outside the state, it must
be held invalid as were the laws at issue in Shafer v. Farmers Grain
Co. and Southern Pacific. " 40

III.

SuMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF

CTS v. Dynamics Corp.

CTS Corporation (CTS) is an Indiana Corporation. Prior to the
origin of this case, Dynamics Corporation of America (Dynamics), a
34. Min;, 457 U.S. at 640 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc, 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970)
citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960)). This test has become known as
the "Pike balancing test" and will be referred to as such in this comment.
35. /d. at 643.
36. /d. at 643-44.
37. /d. at 644.
38. /d. at 645.
39. /d. at 640-43. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger with Justices Stevens
and Powell filing separate concurring opinions. Although the "direct regulation" theory was not
accepted by a majority, it was used by a district court to invalidate a Missouri Takeover Statute.
See lcahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400, 1414-18 (W.O. Mo. 1985).
40. /d. at 643 (citing Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189 (1925) and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945)).
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New York corporation, held 9.6% of CTS's common stock. On March
10, 1986, Dynamics announced a tender offer for an additional one
million shares of CTS stock, the ownership of which would bring Dynamics' interest in CTS to 27.5%. On the same date, Dynamics filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, alleging that CTS had violated federal securities laws.n The
Board of Directors for CTS elected to be governed by the Indiana Business Corporation Law, Control Share Acquisitions Chapter. 42
On March 31, 1986, Dynamics moved to amend its complaint to
allege that the Indiana Anti-takeover Statute was preempted by the
Williams Act" 3 which provides protection to shareholders by requiring
extensive disclosure and by placing investors on equal ground with corporate management. Dynamics also claimed that the Indiana Statute
placed excessive burdens on interstate commerce, thereby violating the
commerce clause;"' which gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce. 411 The district court ruled in favor of Dynamics as to
both issues and granted declaratory relief. The district court stated that
the Indiana statute frustrated the "purpose and objective of Congress"
to create a balance between the parties to a takeover contest 46 and that
the Indiana statute created an "impermissible indirect burden on interstate commerce. " 47
CTS appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
which affirmed the decision of the district court! 8 The United States
41. In its original complaint, Dynamics alleged a number of federal securities act violations
by CTS. However, these allegations became irrelevant after Dynamics amended its complaint to
allege only that the Indiana Act was unconstitutional under the MITE precedent.
42. IND. ConE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (Burns Supp. 1987). This statute is an
example of a "Second Generation" "voting rights model" anti-takeover statute. Generally its provisions provide that 1) shareholders acquiring "control shares" of 20o/o, 33%, and 50% of outstanding shares may be denied voting rights unless they comply with the statute ( § 23-1-42-1 ), 2)
holders of "disinterested shares" are required to vote their shares to determine if the offeror shall
have voting rights in the additional shares acquired (§ 23-1-42-3), and 3) transferability of shares
is restricted and the target corporation may redeem the shares within a specified period after
acquisition by the offeror ( § 23-1-42-10 sixty days).
For additional types of "Second Generation" statutes, a term used to identify anti-takeover
statutes passed after MITE, see Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and
State Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 473, 478-83 (1987).
43. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 637 F. Supp. 389, 391 (N.D. Ill. 1986). See
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f)(1982 and Supp. III 1985).
44. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, d. 3.
45. By amending its complaint, Dynamics was able to utilize MITE and its progeny. This
strategy, if successful, would present the opportunity for quick resolution, while allowing Dynamics to continue its tender offer efforts.
46. Dynamics Corp., 637 F. Supp. at 399.
47. /d. at 406.
48. Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
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Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the district and appellate
Courts and concluded that the Indiana statute was consistent with the
provisions and purpose of the Williams Act and was not an excessive
burden on interstate commerce. 49 Examination of the Court's Williams
Act and commerce clause analysis provides a better understanding of
the issues involved, introduces the provisions and application of the Indiana Act and prepares the way for differentiating CTS and MITE.

A. The Supremacy Clause and the Preemptive Effect of the Williams
Act
Dynamics contended that the Indiana statute was preempted by
the Williams Act because it was inconsistent with the purposes of the
federal act. The general purpose of the Williams Act is to reg uire disclosure of information to shareholders 110 and to protect their power to
decide how to vote and manage their own shares. The Court disagreed
with Dynamics' allegation of inconsistency. It first noted that federal
law may preempt state law " 'where compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility ... ,' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or where
the state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) ... .'' 111 The Court concluded that entities
could comply with both the Indiana Act and the Williams Act, and,
therefore, that the Indiana Act could be preempted only if it frustrated
the purposes of the federal act. 112
The Court then set out the two basic requirements which Congress intended the Williams Act to impose on offerors in order to
"plac[ e] investors on an equal footing with the takeover bidder.'' 113
First, it requires a statement disclosing information regarding the offeror's background and identity, the source and amount of funds, the
purpose of the purchase, shares already owned and other information
on any contracts or arrangements concerning the securities. 114 Second,
the Williams Act includes procedural protections. These provisions include 1) the rights of shareholders to withdraw tender of their shares

49. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
50. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. I (1985)(the U.S. Supreme Court declared that the Williams Act is primarily a disclosure statute).
51. CTS, 481 U.S. at 79 (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
52. !d. at 79.
53. !d. at 82 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. I, 30 (1977) quoting the
Senate Report accompanying the Williams Act, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967)).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (d)(\)(1982); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-l, 240.14d-3 (1986).
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within specified periods of time;&& 2) the length of time an offer must
remain open;& 6 3) pro rata purchase of shares if tendered shares exceed
the number the offeror seeks;&7 and 4) offeror obligation to pay the
same price for all shares acquired.&s
The Court determined that the Indiana statute was not inconsistent with the purposes of these Williams Act provisions. It concluded
that the Indiana Act "protects them [the shareholders] from the coercive
aspects of some tender offers" by allowing shareholders to vote as a
group, while still allowing individuals to tender individually.&& In addition, the Court held that the Indiana statute did not create unreasonable delay in tender offer communication and deliberation when compared with the waiting periods of the Williams Act. 6 ° Consequently,
the Court found that the Williams Act did not preempt the Indiana Act
since the state provisions did not conflict with the provisions or purposes of the federal act. 61

B.

The Commerce Clause

Dynamics also claimed that the Indiana statute violated the commerce clause, 62 citing Edgar v. MITE Corp. 63 for the proposition that
state anti-takeover statutes violate the commerce clause by putting excessive burdens on interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit agreed with Dynamics.
The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument. It distinguished MITE from CTS by stating that the Illinois anti-takeover
statute in MITE 64 exceeded the state's rights by regulating out-of-state
corporations and protecting out-of-state shareholders. 6 &In contrast, the
Indiana statute regulates only Indiana corporations and "applies only
to corporations with a substantial number of shareholders in Indi55. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(5)(1982 and Supp. III 1985); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1)(1986).
Shareholders may withdraw their offers within the first 7 business days of the tender offer or after
60 days from the offer's commencement if the offeror has not purchased.
56. A tender offer must remain open to shareholders for 20 business days. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14e-l (a)( 1986 ).
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(6)(1982 and Supp. III 1985); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (8)(1986).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(7)(1982 and Supp. III 1985).
59. CTS, 481 U.S. at 82-83.
60. /d. at 85.
61. /d. at 86.
62. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
63. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
64. Illinois Business Takeover Act, ILL REv. STAT., ch. 121 Yz, para. 137.51 to 137.70
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)(repealed 1983).
65. CTS, 481 U.S. at 93.
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ana." 68 This limited application of the statute was within the state's
power to regulate commerce since the state had an interest in, and benefited from, protecting such entities. 67

IV.

RECONCILING AND DIFFERENTIATING THE CASES

Close examination of the MITE and CTS cases suggests that the
United States Supreme Court correctly decided the issues presented by
anti-takeover statute litigation. CTS thereby offers an effective precedent to be followed in future cases. The Court properly identified the
factors used in other anti-takeover statute struggles and, using these
factors, distinguished the Indiana statute from other disputed statutes.
By doing so, the Court provided a consistent extension of prior cases.
These effects appear not only to conform to the purposes of the Williams Act and commerce clause, but to actually promote those purposes
by supplying information and protection to shareholders, and by providing local benefits which outweigh any burdens placed on interstate
commerce.

A.

Consistent Extension of Prior Cases

In tender offer cases decided prior to CTS, the courts' analyses
focused on the purposes of both the Williams Act 68 and the commerce
clause. 89 Where statutes frustrated these purposes the courts declared
them invalid 70 and where the statutes coincided with these purposes the
courts upheld them. 71 The United States Supreme Court followed this
same review procedure in CTS in reaching its decision favoring the validity of the Indiana statute. Thus, CTS furnishes a consistent extension
of prior cases.

66. /d. The Indiana Act provides that "Issuing public corporation" includes only those Indiana corporations that have ( 1) One hundred (1 00) or more shareholders; (2) Its principle place of
business, its principal office, or substantial assets within Indiana; and (3) Either:
(A) More than ten percent (1 Oo/o) of its shareholders resident in Indiana;
(B) More than ten percent (10%) of its shares owned by Indiana residents; or
(C) Ten thousand (1 0,000) shareholders resident in Indiana.
IND. CoDE ANN.§ 23-1-42-4 (Burns Supp. 1986). See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
67. !d. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f)(1982 and Supp. III 1985).
69. See supra note 5.
70. See supra note 1.
71. See, e.g., Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984 )(declaring
Minnesota Takeover Act constitutional).
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1. State anti-takeover provisions giving preemptive effect to the Williams Act

MITE and its progeny identified three major proviSions, found in
many anti-takeover statutes, which frustrate the purposes of the Williams Act. These three provisions are 1) pre-commencement periods, 72
2) hearing deadlines which create unreasonable delays 73 and 3) decisional powers placed in hands other than the shareholders. 74 The
United States Supreme Court followed this established procedure of
analysis and, unlike the MITE decision and its progeny, determined
that the statute in CTS did not frustrate the purposes of the Williams
Act in any of these ways. The CTS statute was upheld because, unlike
the statutes in MITE and its progeny, 711 it "does not give either [target]
management or the offeror an advantage ... , does not impose an indefinite delay on tender offers ... , nor does [it] allow the state government
to interpose its views of fairness between willing buyers and sellers of
shares of the target company." 76
a. Pre-commencement periods. State anti-takeover statutes which
include pre-commencement periods prevent an offeror from communicating the offer to shareholders. 77 Such provisions have been determined
to favor the management of the target corporation. These provisions
generally require an offeror to withhold notice of a tender offer from
shareholders for a specified period of time. By preventing the offeror
from communicating offer information to shareholders, pre-commencement periods give target management time to disseminate their own
information to shareholders. This can unfavorably prejudice shareholders prior to disclosure of the tender offer ,78 particularly in those in72. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 US. 69, 80 (1987).
73. /d. at 81.
74. /d.
75. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC
Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta C:orp., 547 F. Supp. 522
(D. Md. 1982); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (C,th Cir. 1986)
76. CTS, 481 U.S. at 83-84.
77. /d. at 80.
78. [P[roviding the target company with additional time within which to take steps to
combat the offer, the pre-commencement notification provisions furnish incumbent
management with a powerful tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of
the shareholders who will not have an offer before them during this period. These
consequences are precisely what Congress determined should be avoided, and for this
reason, the pre-commencement notification provision frustrates the objectives of the
Williams Act.
MIT/<;, 457 U.S. at 635. In addition, the Court noted that Congress had refused to impose a precommencement requirement during its adoption of the Williams Act. /d. Although the interests of
management are often consistent with the interests of shareholders, since management personnel
are usually shareholders themselves, the protective purposes of the Williams Act are not permis-
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stances when management's interests are opposed to an offer which is
otherwise in the best interests of the shareholders.
The Williams Act protects shareholders by placing them on equal
footing with the offeror and target management. 79 This purpose is frustrated when target management is favored with a period of time to oppose a tender offer before the shareholders are apprised of the offer-which may act to the detriment of shareholders by reducing the
value of their shares or depriving them of an attractive or profitable
decision. 80
The statute in CTS included no such pre-commencement period
provision, eliminating one possible source of conflict or frustration of
the federal act. 81 An offeror could disclose the offer to shareholders
without this required waiting period. Shareholders could therefore be
informed of the offer at the same time target management might try to
avoid the takeover, which allows shareholders to make an informed
choice without the danger of prejudicial influence. The absence of such
a provision allows both target management and the offeror to distribute
information to shareholders on an equal basis.
b. Delayed hearing deadlines. Some anti-takeover statutes, like
the Illinois Act in MITE, have included provisions which allow shareholders, management or state officials to call for hearings prior to any
decision by shareholders concerning tender of their shares or the grant
of voting rights. 82 Where these provisions exist without some reasonable
deadline, unreasonable delay may ensue, preventing shareholders from
exercising their decision-making rights in a timely fashion. Such delays
may "upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring management
[or others] at the expense of stockholders. " 83
The Indiana statute in CTS included a maximum deadline of 50
days within which a meeting had to be held to determine whether an

sive on conditions of consistent interests but rather apply to all tender offers within its scope.
79. CTS, 481 U.S. at 82 (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1, 30 (1977) (quoting the Senate Report accompanying the Williams Act, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong, 1st Sess. 4
(1967)).
80. See Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982); National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennemtt Corp. v. Smith, 637
F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
81. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 23-1-42-11 (Burns Supp. 1987).
82. "The Illinois Act allows the Secretary of State to call a hearing with respect to any
tender offer subject to the Act, and the offer may not proceed until the hearing is completed."
MITE, 457 U.S. at 637.
Although the Act specifies that the Secretary of State's decision should be made within IS
days after the hearing, this period could be extended without limitation. !1.1.. REV. STAT., ch. 121
Vz, paras. 137.57.A, B, C and D (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988)(repealed 1983).
83. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982). See also Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697
F.2d 576, 578 (1983).
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acquiror of control shares 84 should be given voting rights. 811 The United
States Supreme Court held that the 50-day deadline in CTS was within
the 60-day maximum tender offer period created by Congress. 86 Therefore, the deadline in CTS could not be said to create unreasonable delay
in light of the federal statute, even where decisions extend to the maximum deadline date.
c. Decisional powers outside shareholders. State law provisions
which grant decisional powers to state authorities or to persons other
than the shareholders themselves, have been the basis for determining
that some anti-takeover statutes are invalid. 87 In MITE, the United
States Supreme Court stated that giving the Secretary of State authority
to pass on the fairness of a tender offer resulted in "investor protection
at the expense of investor autonomy," and that "Congress intended for
investors to be free to make their own decisions." 88
In CTS the United States Supreme Court encountered no such
provision in the Indiana statute under scrutiny. Under the Indiana statute, the shareholders are the only persons with power to grant the voting rights of a control share acquiror. 89 This allows the shareholders to
protect themselves and their investment by casting votes in what they
believe to be their best interest. Once again, this is consistent with the
Williams Act since it allows investors to make their own decisions as to
the fairness of an offer or action.

2.

State anti-takeover provisions and the commerce clause

Like the Williams Act, the commerce clause has been an essential
part of the courts' analyses in anti-takeover statute cases. The commerce clause provides that Congress may regulate interstate commerce.90 Courts have consistently expressed concern that anti-takeover
statutes not be allowed to place excessive burdens on interstate commerce. To uphold a state anti-takeover statute under the commerce
clause, courts require that 1) there be a substantial state interest and
benefit which exceeds the burden placed on interstate commerce91 and
2) the statute be applied primarily to in-state corporations and share84. IND. Com: ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (Burns Supp. 1987).
85. /d. at§ 23-1-42-7.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d)(5)(1982 and Supp. III 1985).
87. !t.I.. REv. STAT., ch. 121 Yz, para. 137.57.£ (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988). See, e.g., Cardiff
Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1984).
88. MITE, 457 U.S. at 639-40.
89. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 83 (1987).
90. /d. at 87.
91. See supra notes 34, 47-49 and accompanying text.
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holders. 92 The United States Supreme Court found that the CTS statute met both of these requirements and declared the statute valid, unlike MITE and its progeny.
a. Benefit-burden balance test. A state statute will be upheld if it
"regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental ... unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefit." 93 Courts have interpreted this to mean that direct regulation of interstate commerce by the states is not permissible. 94
Any regulation must be indirect and must effect a local benefit which
outweighs the burden it places on interstate commerce.
Although the Pike test, set forth above, is the traditional commerce
clause balancing test and was relied upon by the Court in MITE, the
Court did not mention this test in CTS. Some authorities have speculated that the Court saw no need to perform this balance test since it
had concluded that tender offers constitute an area in which the states
may regulate. 911
The United States Supreme Court stated in CTS that:
It thus is an accepted part of the business landscape in this country
for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares. A State
has an interest in promoting stable relationships among parties involved in the corporations charters, as well as in ensuring that investors in such corporations have an effective voice in corporate affairs. 96

b. Application limited to state interests. By creating its anti-take92. See supra notes 37, 47-49 and accompanying text.
93. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
94. See supra notes 39, 40 and accompanying text.
95. The balancing approach as traditionally articulated requires a weighing of local benefits
against incidental interstate burdens .... However, once it is assumed that the state properly can
regulate in a manner that directly affects the economic interests of nonresidents-which inevitably
may create burdens on interstate commerce-this test collapses into a simple cost-benefit analysis
of the law. In many respects, the Court's hands-off approach in CTS is a return to an older style
of commerce clause analysis, in which a determination that an issue was particularly suited for
state-by-state regulation effectively ended the inquiry. See, e.g., South Carolina State Highway
Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). The Court's approach may be a product of the
assumption that a shareholder implicitly consents to be governed by the laws of the state of incorporation when he or she purchases shares, thereby eliminating at least part of the justification for
heightened federal court scrutiny. One factor that may have contributed to the Court's unwillingness to engage in a serious balancing was that no evidentiary record was established in the district
court on the effects of the statute or its motivation; indeed, the state of Indiana did not intervene
until the case was on appeal.
Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REv. 96, 103 n.45 (1988).
96. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
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over statute, the state of Indiana was simply exercising its right to regulate its own corporations. The statute in CTS was limited in application to businesses incorporated in Indiana. 97 This limitation has not
been present in any of the anti-takeover statutes invalidated under the
commerce clause. 98
In addition, the Indiana statute in CTS requires that an Indiana
corporation have a substantial number of Indiana shareholders before
the statute applies. 99 The Court acknowledged in CTS that "unlike the
Illinois statute invalidated in MITE, the Indiana Act applies only to
corporations that have a substantial number of shareholders in
lndiana." 100
The differences between the CTS statute and the statutes in other
anti-takeover statute cases, are material regarding this limitation of application.101 By limiting the statute to resident corporations with a substantial number of resident shareholders, the statute in CTS applies
only to corporations and shareholders in which the state has a substantial and legitimate local interest. Due to these limits, the statute is only
an incidental burden to interstate commerce, far outweighed by the interests and benefits the statute bestows on the state of Indiana.

B.

Underlying Attitude Toward Tender Offers

One commentator has suggested, "One profound difference between MITE and CTS is the attitude of the Court toward takeovers." 102
In MITE the Court glorified hostile takeovers as an effective mechanism for "reallocating economic resources and disciplining inefficient
management." 103 The Court's approach relied upon then current academic publications, which heavily espoused the view that the law
should require target management to accept a passive role during hostile takeovers. 104
In contrast, the Court adopts a more skeptical attitude toward the
97. See IND. CoDE ANN. § 23-1-42-5 (Burns Supp. 1987).
98. See MITE, 457 U.S. 624 (1982); Bendix, 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982); National
City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637
F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
99. IND. CoDE § 23-1-42-4(a)(Supp. 1986).
100. CTS, 481 U.S. at 93.
101. /d.
102. Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams Act, the Commerce Clause, and Insider Trading, 1987 SuP. CT. REv. 47, 93 (1988).
103. Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment
on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 102 (1988).
104. /d.; See, e.g., Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981)(a classic article advocating this
view and drawn from heavily by MITE).
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virtues of tender offers in CTS. This change in attitude is illustrated by
Justice Powell's comment that
[i]t is appropriate to note when discussing the merits and demerits of
tender offers that generalizations usually require qualification. No
one doubts that some successful tender offers will provide more effective management or other benefits such as needed diversification. But
there is no reason to assume that the type of conglomerate corporation
that may result from repetitive takeovers necessarily will result is [sic]
more effective management or otherwise be beneficial to shareholders.
The divergent views in the literature-and even now being debated in
the Congress-reflect the reality that the type and utility of tender
offers vary widely. 10 ~

A number of studies, undertaken in recent years, "criticize the coercive or otherwise problematic characteristics of some tender offers ...
106
."
This reasoning reveals that one valid, underlying difference between MITE and CTS is the evidence that these takeovers have proved
less attractive than they at one time appeared and, therefore, stand less
deserving of the positive presumption previously given.
Another possible reason for the Court's change of attitude may be
the criminal indictments of persons allegedly engaged in unlawful insider trading in connection with takeover activity. 107
The Court's skeptical attitude also may have been influenced by contemporary events. The considerable social or cultural dislocation involved in a takeover severely tests an academic preference for a free
takeover market, and the recent insider trading scandals involving
the arbitrage community have cast a harsh light on the acquisition
business. 108

v.

PROBABLE EFFECTS OF

CTS

The CTS case is bound to have some immediate effects in the area
105. CTS, 481 U.S. at 92 n.13 (emphasis in original).
106. Langevoort, 101 HARV. L. REv. at 102. In footnote 40 Professor Langevoort cites the
following articles criticizing characteristics of tender offers:
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1722-23 (1985); Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. Rt:v. 1377, 1401-02 (1986); Coffee, Regulating the Market
for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate
Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1169 (1984 ); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood
in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 CoLUM. L. Rt:v. 249, 307-09
(1983)
/d.
107. Fischel, 1987 Sur. Gr. REv. at 93.
108. Langevoort, 101 HARV. L. Rt:v. at 103 (emphasis added). See also Fischel, 1987 SuP.
Cr. Rt:v. at 93-95.
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of state anti-takeover legislation. The correctness of the United States
Supreme Court's decision is reflected by considering its impact on the
three classes of parties involved in tender offers, namely, 1) the states,
2) the shareholders, and 3) both the offeror and target managements.

A.

Impact on the States

Although the extent of CTS's impact cannot be immediately ascertained, it is evident that some effects will be almost immediate. 109 First,
CTS confirms the states' rights to protect the interests of its resident
shareholders and resident corporations. 110 This right has been declared
by some courts and authorities, 111 but because an overwhelming majority of cases declared state anti-takeover statutes invalid, 112 it became
questionable whether the states could actually regulate within the fedI 09. The following sentiment existed while awaiting the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in the CTS case: "The Supreme Court's decision in Dynamics will undoubtedly provide greater
clarity in this area, while at the same time spawning a new generation of state statutes designed to
squeeze through the interstices of the Court's opinion." Danilow and Bentley, State Takeover
Statutes After MIT/'.', 20 REV. SEc. & CoMMODITIES REG. 13, 21 (1987). This statement reOects
the importance of the CTS decision, even before the case was heard. In addition, it exemplifies the
understanding of the states and many authorities that there is room for this exercise of their
power. It also recognizes the commitment of the states to discover the boundaries of this power and
legislate accordingly
110. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
111. The right of the states to regulate in this area was never completely foreclosed in the
pre-CTS cases. The following quotes, issued prior to CTS, represent the view that the states have
the right to regulate tender offers, so long as the regulation is confined to a yet undefined degree:
I join Part V-B [of the majority opinion] because its Commerce Clause reasoning leaves
some room for state regulation of tender offers .... I agree with Justice Stevens that
the Williams Act's neutrality policy does not necessarily imply a congressional intent to
prohibit state legislation designed to assure-at least in some circumstances-greater
protection to interests that include but often are broader than those of incumbent
management.
MIT/':, 457 U.S. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring).
I am not persuaded, however, that Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in
its own legislation is tantamount to a federal prohibition against state legislation
designed to provide special protection for incumbent management. Accordingly, although I agree with the Court's assessment of the impart of the Illinois statute, I do not
join its preemption holding.
MIT/':, 457 U.S. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring).
We have reservations, however, about the district court's conclusionary statement that
MITE Corp. 'sounded the death knell for state control of federally regulated tender
offers,' if the court meant by this statement that all state regulation regarding tender
offers is foreclosed.
Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holdnman, 796 F.2d 135, 139 n.S (6th Cir. 1986)(emphasis m
original).
112. See supra note 7. Although a number of cases were decided in this area bet ween the
MITE and CTS decisions, only Cardiff Acquisitions, Inr. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir.
1984)(upholding the Minnesota Takeover Act) was decided in favor of the state regulation.
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era! provisions of the Williams Act and the commerce clause. 113 CTS
substantiates this state right, to the extent that the states properly confine such regulations.
Second, CTS provides guidelines along which the states may structure anti-takeover statutes. Prior to CTS, the states lacked a standard
by which such statutes could be measured. 114 MITE and its progeny
told the states what could not be done, rather than giving guidelines as
to what could be done, within the federal and constitutional framework.1111 Those cases provided no guarantee that state statutes would be
held constitutional if the statutes avoided the "trouble provisions" identified in these cases. 116 Because the Indiana statute passed scrutiny
under the factors of the Williams Act and the commerce clause, CTS
demonstrates that such provisions will be upheld if states adopt provisions which protect the shareholder's decision-making power and access
to information, while providing substantial benefits to the states' residents. It is presently unclear if the Indiana statute represents the ultimate extent of regulation available to the states. However, CTS does
represent an acceptable starting point from which states may proceed.
At least for the present, it is clear that by drafting provisions consistent
with the Indiana statute scrutinized in CTS, the states will be on safe
ground.

B.

CTS Effects on Shareholders and Corporate Management
As a result of the CTS case, it is likely that many states will adopt

similar statutes, resulting in at least two major effects on shareholders
and corporate management. First, as intended by the Williams Act, all
parties will be put on equal footing; 117 that is, management of both the
target company and the offeror will be required to "lay their cards on
the table," providing shareholders with access to information, thereby
giving shareholders the opportunity to make well-informed decisions.
Second, the power to make decisions will be in the hands of the
shareholders. Management's only part will be to disseminate information, without the ability to prejudice the shareholders prior to disclosure
113. See Comment, State Regulation of Tender Offers: Legislating Within the Constitutional Framework, 54 FoRDHAM L. REv. 885 (1986)(states that the MITE decision has cast
doubt on the ability of states to effectively regulate tender offers).
114. Block, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation", 13 SEc.
Rf:G. L. J. 332 (1986).
115. CTS provided badly needed clarification in this area of state regulation. Danilow &
Bentley, State Takeover Statutes After Mite, 20 REV. SEC. & CoMMODITIES REG. 13, 21 (1987).
116. The "trouble provisions" include: I) pre-commencement periods; 2) outside decisional
powers; 3) unreasonable delays; 4) substantial out-of-state application; and 5) other provisions;
discussed in previous sections of this comment. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
117. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
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of both sides' positions. This will place all three classes of parties-the
shareholders, the offeror and target management-on the same footing.
The likely result is a fair opportunity for management to present its
proposals and an equally fair opportunity for the shareholders to decide
which proposal is most attractive and beneficial to them.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's decision in CTS provides solid
precedent and sound analysis which should be followed by other courts
in assessing the validity of state anti-takeover statutes. Previous cases
reflected the presumption that states have the authority and right to
enact such protective statutes. CTS is an extension of this presumption
and sets out guidelines which define the extent and content of an enforceable statute. Anti-takeover statutes can successfully comply with
the purposes of the Williams Act and the commerce clause. These statutes must protect the decision-making rights of informed shareholders
and be limited to legitimate interests of the state, and the benefits provided must outweigh the burdens placed on interstate commerce. The
Court's approval of the Indiana statute establishes a model by which
other states may pattern their own statutes. CTS does not exhaust the
possible provisions that might be upheld, since it extends the Court's
MITE analysis in identifying those provisions which will not be allowed in state statutes. However, for now CTS clarifies the right of
states to legislate such administrative regulations and suggests a basis
upon which anti-takeover statutes may be successfully structured.

Michael A. Day

